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Abstract 
The deregulation process in the EU electricity sector triggered strategic decisions that led to industry 
restructuring. This paper presents preliminary evidence of the impact of this process on investors, 
using event studies and estimation techniques such as least squares and GARCH. Our findings suggest 
three stylized facts: 1) regulatory reform in Europe was certainly accompanied by a takeover wave, as 
predicted by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996); 2) mergers and acquisitions had a positive impact on the 
stock price of target firms, and a much lower and sometimes even a negative impact for the bidding 
firms; 3) the effect of takeover announcements on the returns of competitors of the merging firms 
depends on the degree of market power. In countries with high market power (like Spain) competitors 
significantly increase share returns upon takeover announcements, whereas in countries with lower 
market power (like England and Wales) returns do not change significantly. 
Keywords 
Companies, Electricity supply industry deregulation, Oligopoly, Stock Market. 
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I. Introduction* 
This paper presents a preliminary investigation of the impact of regulatory reform in the European 
energy markets on the market for corporate control. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) found that factors 
such as changes in regulatory governmental policies had an important effect on the takeover wave in 
the financial, transport, and energy sectors of the USA in the 1980s and 1990s. Similarly, as we 
document below, energy firms undertook actions in the market for corporate control to adapt to the 
regulatory changes (liberalization, deregulation, regulatory reform, privatization) that took place in 
Europe starting in the last decades of the twentieth century. More specifically, these changes have 
triggered an unprecedented wave of mergers and acquisitions, many of them through takeovers. 
However, there is very little work on the relationship between regulatory changes and corporate 
control activity. In particular, an exercise that has become standard for other industries (to compute 
through event studies the impact of corporate changes on shareholder value and extract economic 
implications from it) has not been extensively applied to European energy firms (see Trillas, 2001, for 
a very limited exception). This paper is a first attempt to fill this gap. 
We provide information on the coincidence in time of regulatory reform and very significant 
changes in corporate ownership, and we quantify the impact of some corporate control events on 
transacting companies’ stock returns through a range of estimation techniques, such as least squares, 
GARCH and SURE. We obtain three important results: 1) The European energy sectors have 
experienced a wave of mergers and acquisitions, which has been contemporaneous to the regulatory 
reform process. 2) There are statistically significant positive abnormal returns for target firms and 
weakly significant negative returns for the bidding firms; and 3) Takeovers have a positive effect on 
the value of competitors in a market characterized by high market power (Spain), and non-
significantly different from zero effect on the value of competitors in a market characterized by low 
market power (England and Wales).  
Significant changes in public policies or technology, supply and demand shocks, trigger changes in 
industry structure. European energy firms are a case in point; they do not stay as spectators of 
regulatory reform, but try to position themselves to face the new challenges. These actions take place 
in many instances through the market for corporate control. Event studies quantify the impact of hese 
actions on shareholder value, and this may provide a test for a variety of economic hypotheses. The 
methodology is based on measuring the reaction of shareholders’ expectations in front of new 
information and, therefore, the expected effect on the firm’s discounted value (see Fama et al., 1969; 
Binder, 1998; Campbell et al., 1997; and Khotari and Warner, 2006). A merger for example may 
create value for shareholders, through efficiencies caused by scale or scope economies, vertical 
integration, or through increased market power. This paper uses OLS and GARCH estimation 
techniques to analize the impact of changes in the corporate control of the main European energy firms 
on their value, as measured through stock prices. Especifically, we first analyze target behavior 
through the impact of takeovers launched on Endesa, Hidrocantábrico, Scottish Power and Unión 
Fenosa. Next we look at the effect of takeovers on the returns of competing firms.1 And finally, we 
quantify the impact of mergers and acquisitions for eleven of the most important energy firms in 
Europe: E.ON, RWE, Endesa, Gas Natural, Iberdrola, Unión Fenosa, ENEL, ENI, Energías de 
Portugal, Suez and Vattenfall.  
                                                     
* We acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Government under projects ECO2010-20718 and ECO2009-06946. 
1 For example, for the three takeovers that had Endesa as target, we analyze their effect on the returns of Iberdrola and 
Unión Fenosa, which are Endesa’s competitors in the Spanish electricity market. 
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After this introduction, we present some hypotheses and explain the methodology and data that will 
be used to test them. Finally, we show the quantitative results in terms of the impact of corporate 
changes on the value of firms, and finally we conclude.  
II. Hypotheses, methodology and data 
A. Hypotheses 
Any expansion of firms raises questions about its impact on shareholder wealth. Event studies provide 
evidence of such impact, by measuring the abnormal returns associated to unanticipated events. To the 
extent that financial markets are efficient, event studies provide evidence on the impact of the 
announcements on the firm’s stream of profits and, therefore, its discounted value. A merger can 
create value for shareholders if there are efficiency synergies (scope or scale economies, vertical 
integration) or if the merger increases market power.2 This usually translates into positive abnormal 
returns for target firms’ shareholders, while stock prices of bidding firms may not significantly 
change. The literature explains this as a free-rider problem : shareholders only sell their shares if the 
bidding price equals the expected price of the shares after the takeover. Then any improvement in the 
value of the firm triggered by the change in management is captured by the shareholders of the target 
firm. It could also happen that value is destroyed as a result of the merger, if the bidding firm overpays 
for the target. This may be a signal that mergers are carried out for reasons that are unrelated to 
shareholder wealth. For example, the optimal size of the firm for managers may be larger than the 
optimal size from the point of view of the value of the firm (empire building).  
We are interested in looking at empirical evidence through the lens of two hypotheses :  
Hypothesis 1:  
The value of target firms in the energy sector increases when a takeover is announced. 
Hypothesis 2:  
The effect of the announcement of a takeover on the value of competitiors depends on the existence of 
market power. If market power is high, competing firms experience statistically significant positive 
abnormal returns.  
A merger becomes an opportunity for the buying firm given the possibility of value creation, 
despite the costs of the transaction. Value creation may result from exogenous changes in supply or 
demand that increase the profit maximizing firm size. Synergies may include more efficient 
management, or a better matching between management and physical assets. They may also include 
vertical efficiencies (through the elimination of double marginalization, through the internalization of 
externalities or through better incentives for sunk investments), or the combination of complementary 
resources. Finally, a higher value of the firm may be due to increased unilateral or multilateral market 
power that derives from a lower number of firms (Eckbo, 1983).  
It could be that improvements in social efficiency derived from a merger can be sufficiently high to 
compensate for the loss of welfare from collusion, if this exists. But if a merger increases the chances 
of collusion, it should be welcomed by shareholders of competing firms. The effect of a takeover or a 
merger announcement on non-merging competitors, however, is a topic that has been less explored 
from an empirical point of view. Eckbo (1983) argues that the sign of the expected effect on rivals is 
unclear. Abnormal returns could be positive, because the number of firms in the industry diminishes, 
and this increases unilateral (for example, in a Cournot model) and multilateral market power (in more 
general repeated oligopoly models), which also benefits the rivals of merging firms. But abnormal 
                                                     
2 Cox and Portes (1998). 
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returns for rivals could also be negative, if they anticipate that the merging firms will be more efficient 
and therefore more competitive, hindering the profitability of their rivals. Consistent with the first 
possibility, Duso et al. (2006) find, for a sample of mergers and acquisitions that were analyzed by the 
European Commission, statistically significant positive abnormal returns for the competitors of the 
merging firms.  
B. Methodology 
Event study techniques have been used to evaluate corporate events and the effect of regulatory 
changes in different industries. Hypotheses that make some prediction for firms’ profits can be tested 
with these widely and increasingly used techniques. A crucial assumption of event studies is that all 
publicly available information is incorporated in stock prices, that is, the semi-strong version of the 
efficient market hypothesis holds. This is not the place to discuss this hypothesis, but it is a salutary 
caveat to remark that many of the economic implications of event studies hold to the extent that this 
hypothesis is valid. 
The most widespread model used to predict normal returns of firm j in period t is the market model. 
Then real returns are compared to these normal returns to obtain a measure of abnormal returns 
(Campbell et al., 1997, and Fama et al., 1969). 
 
tjtmjjtj RR ,,, εβα ++=        (1) 
 with 0)( , =tjE ε  and jtjVar εσε
2
, )( =  
where jtR  are the returns of firm j  in period t , mtR  are the returns of a portfolio of firms 
representing the stock market (we use Eurofirst 300), jα and jβ  are parameters and jtε  is an error 
term. To this model, one can add a dummy variable: 
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Where jγ  captures the abnormal return of action j in the date of event t, directly estimated in the 
regression. One can group sets of actions to compute average abnormal returns, for examples for 
takeover events of a same firm or group of firms. With several firms, it iwould be possible to obtain 
extra information by using a system of equations (Binder, 1985):  
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where nυυ ...1 are the error terms for the n firms. These terms can be heteroskedastic across firms, but 
not correlated over time. It is also possible to introduce restrictions over coefficients, such as equality 
of betas, which can be tested through maximum likelihood or Wald tests.  
As argued by Savickas (2003), an appropriate approach used to estimate the volatility of the 
conditional process of the variance, can be represented as follows: 
tjtjjtmjjtj DRR ,,,, ηγβα +++=       (4) 
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where tjh , is the conditional variance of the time variation and jjjj dcba ,,,  are the coefficients of the 
GARCH (1,1) specification; tjD ,  dummy variable equal to 1 for the date of the event for firm j and 0 
otherwise. jγ  captures the coefficient of the abnormal returns on the date of the announcement. The 
conditional variance tjh ,  provides a natural estimator of the variance of the abnormal returns. 
The GARCH approach explicitly models the volatility of the returns and the possible increase of 
the variance that takes place when there are unforeseen events. In the estimation through a traditional 
approach such as OLS, there is a higher probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when this is not 
false (Savickas, 2003). 
C. Data 
The events concerning takeovers, mergers and acquisitions for each of the firms were selected from 
the data bases LEXIS-NEXIS and OSIRIS. The criterion that was used for their selection was that they 
had the characteristic of a “surprise” event, that is, not anticipated by the market.  
The historical series of daily stocks and indices was obtained from Yahoo Finance3 and in some 
cases directly through the firms (as in the case of the historical series of Hidrocantábrico stock prices; 
Hidrocantábrico ceased to be traded as an independent stock when it was acquired by Electricidade de 
Portugal). The European indices used in the estimations is Eurofirst 300.  
Daily returns are computed using a logarithmic transformation:  
 
  )ln()ln( 1−−= ttt pPR       (7) 
where )ln( 1+= tt rR  exhibits results that are practically identical to a growth rate, with a distribution 
that is more symmetric and that is more convenient for the transformation of the series.  
III. Impact of corporate change on the value of the main European energy firms  
A. The Market for Corporate Control in the Energy Sector 
Europe has seen an unprecedented crossborder mergers and acquisitions wave in the energy sectors at 
the beginning of the XXI century. This seems to have been in preparation or as a reaction to regulatory 
reform in the industry. If companies cannot influence market rules, they may try to influence industry 
structure. We present in this subsection some case studies that show how takeovers in energy sectors 
are protracted and how the setting is such that the shareholders of the target firms stand to gain much 
more than the shareholders of bidding firms. 
The Endesa Takeover Battle 
In September 2005 the Spanish firm Gas Natural made an offer for Endesa that triggered a bitter 
economic and political debate, because a company based in Barcelona (the second largest city in the 
country) was trying to take over a company based in the capital Madrid. The management team of 
Endesa defended its position using political and economic strategies. In 2006, an offer by E.On 
improved upon the one by Gas Natural, although it was also initially rejected by the management 
team, and triggered a reaction by the Spanish government trying to stop a surprise acquisition of 
control by foreign interests. This reaction included a discretional change in the rules of the elecricity 
                                                     
3 http://finance.yahoo.com 
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regulatory agency that allowed this agency to stop a merger appealing to reasons of security of supply 
or national interest. In 2007, the battle finished with an Italian company, ENEL, which had the Italian 
state as the main shareholder, gaining control of the compay in partnership with a Spanish construction 
firm, apparently with the agreement of the Spanish government. 
Spanish electricity firms (and especially Endesa) had been among the protagonists of a remarkable 
expansion process characterized by investments in Latin America, investments or alliances in the rest 
of Europe, and diversification in the telecommunications and other industries. The largest in 
magnitude have been the acquisitions in Latin America.  
The expansion of Endesa in Latin America, like that of Telefónica, the Spanish incumbent 
telecommunications operator, started and gathered momentum when the largest shareholder of the 
company was the state, prior to the full privatization of the firm. The global result of the expansion in 
Latin America was neutral for Endesa’s shareholders, according to the event study technique, although 
the impact of the largest acquisition, the takeover of Chilean firm Enersis, was negative according to 
two studies mentioned below. Endesa also expanded in telecommunications (Retevisión, Amena, 
Menta, later integrated under the company name Auna), although it has recently abandoned this 
industry after the sale of Auna to Ono and France Telecom.4 Both in Telefónica and in Endesa there 
are reasons to believe that the main corporate control mechanisms did not work appropriately. There 
were no shareholders with a controlling stake, there was no credible takeover threat at the time (either 
because of public ownership at the early stages of the expansions, or because of the government’s 
threat to use the golden share), and product market and managerial labor market competition were 
scarce. The only factors that provided external discipline to managers were the fact that the 
companies’ stock was quoted in international markets and the presence of institutional shareholders, as 
well as the slow and progressive introduction of product market competition (especially in mobile 
telephony in telecommunications and in the generation segment in electricity). The takeover of 
Enersis, the largest privatized electricity firm in Chile, in the late 1990s, took longer and was more 
costly than expected, and with a negative effect on (both bidder and target) shareholder wealth. It is 
not clear either that Chilean consumers were better off with the takeover. On the one hand, the 
takeover put pressure on the Chilean regulator to improve competition conditions in electricity, by 
triggering a debate on vertical integration. But Endesa won the takeover battle by defeating an offer by 
the American firm Duke Energy, which was less willing to pay the high cost of a protracted and 
politicized battle, but it may well have had a better business plan for consumers.  
Precise quantitative evidence on the effects of Spanish firms’ expansion comes from event studies, 
which provide a measurement of the impact of particular events on shareholders’ expectations (and, 
therefore, to the extent that financial markets are efficient, a quantification of the expected effect on 
the firm’s discounted value). Trillas (2001) concentrates on the Endesa case, with especial attention on 
the Enersis takeover. This study reveals a negative and significant impact on their own shareholders 
and on the minority shareholders of the target firm in the largest acquisition of Endesa in Latin 
America. However, existing event studies, either they present a too general picture, or a too narrow 
one, without presenting as yet a quantification of the effect on shareholders of all corporate control 
transactions in the overall electricity industry. The fact that the largest firms have been acquirers 
makes it likely that the global result will most probably not be a net gain for shareholders (given that 
the bidder shareholders usually obtain worse results than target shareholders), but the exact 
quantitative exercise remains to be done, and will probably and reasonably have to wait until the 
takeover wave ends. The increasing takeover threat on these large firms can more recently be a 
                                                     
4 Unión Fenosa is also a Spanish electricity firm with significant investments outside the energy sectors, for example in the 
Airports sector in Mexico, or in the engineering sector with subsidiary Soluziona. Although diversification ouside the 
energy sectors have been punished by investors, the participation of the same firm both in electricity and gas markets is 
broadly accepted as a value-creating development, due to productive efficiency gains obtained through mainly vertical 
integration in the provision of gas as an input in electricity generation, and also to joint offers in the retail supply of gas 
and electricity. 
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discipline mechanism for managers, who possibly will be in a learning process on how to better 
measure investment risks.  
After the Gas Natural takeover, E.On showed interest in Endesa. E.On is the result of the merger of 
two large electricity firms in Germany in the late 90s, Veba and Viag. The resulting firm very soon 
engaged in a number of international acquisitions, such as Sydkraft in Sweden and Powergen in the 
United Kingdom, and merged with the dominant German gas operator, Ruhrgas. In early 2006, E.On 
announced its last big acquisition, a takeover over Spanish Endesa, competing with a previous 
takeover launched by the Spanish gas firm Gas Natural. E.On thus followed the pattern of first 
creating a strong national firm and next expanding internationally. 
The Powergen and Endesa acquisitions were presented both as friendly or “white knight” 
acquisitions. Powergen and Endesa also have in common that they were both the result of privatization 
and had been diversifying in other industries and geographically -Powergen in the US and Endesa in 
Latin America.  
The example of E.On is often shown to illustrate a trend towards vertically integrated global 
utilities focused both on gas and electricity, but abandoning investments in other industries such as 
telecommunications. The only significant effect of the main E.On acquisition announcements in the 
recent past is a positive abnormal return at the time of the Ruhrgas merger announcement. The 
announcement of the acquisitions of Powergen and Endesa did not have a significantly different from 
zero effect on shareholder value, although the sign of the abnormal return in the Endesa case is 
positive. This is consistent with the theoretical and empirical research on takeovers, which expects that 
shareholder gains are captured by the target firm shareholders. In contrast with the acquisition of 
Enersis by Endesa, however, at least the acquiring shareholders do not expect to lose from these 
acquisitions. Since 2000 the stock market behavior of E.On had been much better than that of Endesa. 
One may thus conclude, first, that expanding firms can show very different performance in the stock 
market depending on the details of expansion, and that firms with expanding strategies that are not 
welcomed by shareholders (bad bidders), risk being taken over by even stronger rivals (that is, they 
risk becoming good targets). 
Since E.ON stepped in at the end of February 2006 with a bigger and better offer than that of Gas 
Natural, the government manoeuvred to frustrate it. E.ON was offering €29.1 billion ($34.7 billion) 
for Endesa—the biggest takeover bid in the history of the utilities industry—compared with Gas 
Natural's €22.5 billion cash-and-stock offer. After its own antitrust authority and the EU approved 
E.ON's proposal in April, the government's obstructionism intensified. Eager to thwart the deal, the 
government invested special powers in CNE, which is Spain's energy regulator and is controlled by a 
board that is close to the government. At the end of July 2006 the CNE imposed 19 conditions on 
E.ON's bid for Endesa, such as a commitment to invest in gas-transmission networks and an 
obligation to keep Endesa properly capitalised. Three of the CNE's demands were very controversial. 
First, E.ON would have to sell the only nuclear-power plant wholly owned by Endesa. Next, it would 
also have to sell all of Endesa's coal-powered plants, because Spanish coal is subsidised and the 
government is worried that the Germans would use cheaper imports. Third, Endesa's operations on the 
Balearic and Canary Islands, and in northern Africa, must be divested.  
The corporate control of Endesa was quite contested: four firms were involved in the competition 
for the prize, two Spanish firms (one from the gas sector, Gas Natural; and another from the 
construction sector, Acciona); a German one, E.On; and an Italian one, Enel. After a takeover battle of 
more than two years, the end seemed to be near when on 1st Octubre 2007 ENEL and Acciona 
announced that they were in posesión of 92.06% of the shares. However, it was not until February 
2009 that ENEL obtained full ownership of Endesa, after a series of discrepancies with Acciona. The 
control battle that had started on September 5th 2005 finished almost two and a half years later.  
On July 4th 2007, the Spanish energy regulatory agency CNE approved, under twelve conditions, 
the takeover launched by ENEL and Acciona. The next day, the takeover was also approved by the 
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European Commission. Between August 2005 (one month prior to the first takeover by Gas Natural) 
until October 2007 (when ENEL and Acciona effectively acquired 92.06% of Endesa), the value of the 
shares of Endesa increased in 119%5.  
Using the GARCH methodology suggested by Savickas (2003), the average abnormal returns for 
Endesa shareholders of events related to the takeover battle were 4.16%. The OLS results are 2.72%. 
This is consistent with our hypothesis that target firm shareholders are winners in takeover battles. 
The Hidrocantábrico Takeover Battle 
In 2000, EnBW, a German subsidiary of the state owned French firm EDF, announced a takeover of 
Hidrocantábrico, the fourth largest electricity firm in Spain, which has most of its assets in the 
northern region of Asturias. The Spanish government reacted passing a law forbidding any foreign 
state-owned firm from controlling an electricity company. This law would be subsequently rejected by 
the European institutions. The Asturias regional government was more open to bargaining, and since 
the beginning showed a predisposition to lobby for the takeover in exchange for industrial and 
employment concessions. The takeover battle triggered by the initial EDF offer ended four years later, 
in 2004, when the state-owned Electricidade de Portugal (EDP), in partnership with a regional savings 
bank, Cajastur, made a final winning offer that was accepted by the shareholders of Hidrocantábrico, 
committing the firm to keep its headquarters in Asturias and develop a number of industrial 
development and employment programs. 
The case of the ownership and control change in Hidrocantábrico illustrates some of the more 
interesting aspects in the corporate control market in Spain, namely the role of the different levels of 
government (European, Spanish, regional), the saving banks, the state owned firms and target firm 
managers. Hidrocantábrico unsuccessfully opted to buy Viesgo when Endesa put it up for sale. 
Besides, the takeovers of Unión Fenosa and Ferroatlántica-EnBW implied the withdrawal of other 
takeovers that had been launched, respectively, by the US firm Texas Utilities and the German firm 
RWE. Furthermore, the Spanish government lifted the veto on the political rights of foreign state 
owned firms in Hidrocantábrico in September 2003 after receiving a warning from the European 
Commission.  
Hidrocantábrico was the target of five takeovers in 2000 and 2001, those launched by Texas 
Utilities, Unión FENOSA, Ferroatlántica-EnBW, RWE and Cajastur-EDP. That is, one US firm, two 
German firms (one of them with the state owned French firm EDF as the main shareholder), one 
Portuguese firm and one Spanish firm. The Belgian firm Electrabel also participated in the takeover 
contest as a minority shareholder. The winning takeover was that of Ferroatlántica-EnBW, although 
Cajastur and EDP stayed as minority shareholders. Eventually, EDP acquired, in a direct transaction in 
2004, a share package from the rest of shareholders to reach 95% of the stock, in such a way that 
Hidrocantábrico became a subsidiary of EDP, with a Chairman proposed by the minority local 
shareholder, saving bank Cajastur. The successful foreign companies, first EnBW and next EDP, 
participated in the contest in alliance with local investors, with the goal of overcoming political 
resistance associated to the loss of control by national shareholders.  
The control contest for Hidrocantábrico, the fourth largest Spanish electricity firm, lasted more 
than one year between 2000 and 2001, and it did not end in practice until 2004 with the assumption of 
total control by EDP.  
One of the interesting issues in this takeover battle was that the regional government from Asturias 
(one of the Spanish Autonomous Communities in the North of Spain, where the company headquarters 
and most of its assets are located) and the then incumbent management team called for the takeover 
battle to take place, setting as condition that the firm kept its headquarters in Asturias and that the 
                                                     
5 Between October 2003 and October 2005 there were 20 takeovers in Spain with an average premium for minoritary 
shareholders of target firms of 20.3% over the share prices the day before the takeover was announced.  
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ownership change was compatible with maintaining industrial and employment objectives in the 
region. The Asturias regional government went to the extreme of criticizing the Spanish government 
over the takeover battle, because the Spanish central government was against the presence of firms 
controlled by foreign state-owned capital, while the Asturias government was willing to accept such 
presence if it made possible to have a strong subsidiary with its headquarters in Asturias, and willing 
to cooperate in industrial and employment objectives. This illustrates that not all governments support 
national or regional champions in the same way. With the outcome of the battle, economic and social 
agents in Asturias managed to make compatible strong gains for shareholders; the entry of a strong 
firm with the ambition to be a key player in the forthcoming (although several times postponed) 
Iberian Electricity Market together with the largest Spanish electricity firms, implying consumer gains 
from product market competition and improved productive efficiency; and the guarantee that the new 
owners would cooperate with “strategic” objectives of industrial and employment policy, as 
interpreted by the Asturias regional government.  
Between the starting point of the takeover battle and the approval of the final bid by the European 
Commission in March 2002, the share prices of Hidrocantábrico increased by 120%. 
Using the GARCH methodology, the average abnormal returns for Hidrocantábrico shareholders of 
events related to the takeover battle were 3.1%. The OLS results are 1.7%. This is again consistent 
with our hypothesis that target firm shareholders are winners in takeover battles.  
Merger between Iberdrola and Scottish Power 
The process of the acquisition of Scottish Power by Iberdrola only lasted five months. Iberdrola 
announced its interest in the Scottish firm on November 8th, 2006, and the courts in Edimburgh 
resolved the last barriers for the integration of both firms on 23 de April, 23d, 2007. A plausible 
explanation of this is that market power in the British energy market is not high. This is one of the few 
energy markets in Europe where concentration levels are relatively low.6 This was ratified by the 
European Commission when it approved the transaction without conditions on February 15th, 2007. 
On March 2nd of the same year, the parties obtained the last regulatory approval by the Public Utilities 
Commission of the State of New York in the US, which was needed given that both merging firms had 
assets in the American market. 
The surprise announcement of the acquisition on November 8th 2006 was associated to a 3% 
abnormal return, computed both with the GARCH and OLS methodologies. If we compute the impact 
on shareholders between one month before the takeover, October 2006, and April 2007, when the 
acquisition is finally authorized, the share price increased in 20%.  
Compared with the much higher increase of the value of Endesa and Hidrocantábrico during their 
takeover battles, in this case the value increase is substantially lower. One possible explanation is that 
these Spanish firms operated in a context of higher market power, with larger rents to be captured 
from reducing the number of firms. Campa and Hernando (2004) find that the announcements of 
mergers and acquisitions for firms in industries that had previously been under strong regulatory 
controls, obtain comparatively lower abnormal returns than when regulatory controls are less strict.  
Merger between Gas Natural and Unión Fenosa 
After the failed attempt to take over Endesa in 2005, Gas Natural acquired Unión Fenosa in 2009. The 
day that the acquisition was announced, the shares of the acquired firm experienced abnormal returns, 
-4.1% with the GARCH model and -4% with OLS. The Credit Rating Agency Fitch stated that there 
were likely negative implications of the debt increase in Gas Natural as a result of the operation 
                                                     
6 For example the HHI for the UK after 1999 has been below 1000 points (Mattes et al., 2005). The thresholds established 
by the US and the EU define a market as highly concentrated at 1800 and 2000 respectively. A market with a HHI below 
1000 is defined as non-concentrated.  
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(Reuters 31-07-2008). The transaction took place in two stages. In the first, the gas company, after the 
approval by the Spanish regulatory agency CNE, bought 9.99% of the shares on August 17th, 2008, 
and on February 26th, 2009, it bought the remaining 35.32%. With this purchase, it obtained 50.02% 
of the shares in the company, since it had a minority stake prior to the first stage. The second stage 
required launching a takeover for the rest of the shares, in a process that concluded on April 2009, 
after the stock exchange regulator, CNMV, authorized the takeover on March 18th, 2009. The share 
price of the acquired firms, between the announcement of the acquisition until the final authorization 
by the CNMV, increased in 42% (see Graph 4).  
The facts in corporate control market for Spanish electricity firms in the last decade are consistent 
with some of the predictions derived from academic research:  
• -Liberalization has triggered a mergers and acquisitions wave, to the extent of involving all the 
firms in the industry, and has caused an increase in shareholder concentration.  
• -Takeovers in an industry where regulation still play an important role are protracted, not always 
successful and have a (sometimes too) high cost for shareholders in acquiring firms.  
• -Politicization of the control market in this industry shows in the background of some managers 
and in the reasons by which some takeovers find obstacles or are the object of heated debates 
with little economic or financial content. The activism of a variety of interest groups (such as 
managers, shareholders, local and regional communities) confirms that collusion between policy 
makers and lobbies is an important fact in this kind of industries, and that the conduct of 
regulatory institutions is seriously affected by its presence.  
• -Resistance to ownership changes reveals the importance that society, as mediated by its political 
agents, allocates to the control of firms. The specificity and long lived nature of investments still 
attract, in spite of liberalization, owners that are different from the profile of other capitalist 
private owners, especially state-owned firms and saving banks (which in Spain have a nature 
close to that of non profit mutual firms). Liberalization (wich only happens in some segments of 
the value chain) does not fundamentally alter the fact that long lived specific investments are still 
subject to a high regulatory, technology and market risk. The Spanish government stopped 
mergers between Spanish energy firms (Fenosa-Hidrocantábrico, Hidrocantábrico-Viesgo, 
Endesa-Iberdrola) consistently with the goal of not increasing national levels of industry 
structure concentration after the expansion of Endesa prior to its full privatization in the late 90s, 
but did not take advantage of the takeovers (for example through the imposition of conditions) or 
of the privatization of Endesa to achieve a less concentrated industry structure.  
Effects of the takeovers on competitors’ returns  
We also studied the effect that the Endesa and Hidrocantábrico takeover announcements had on their 
closest competitors in the Spanish electricity pool. In all cases, competitors experience statistically 
significant positive abnormal returns. For example, on occasion of the Endesa takeovers, competitors 
Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa experienced abnormal returns of 2.1% and 1%, respectively (both with 
GARCH and OLS). On occasion of the Hidrocantábrico takeovers, competitors Endesa, Iberdrola and 
Unión Fenosa experience on average abnormal returns of 1.7%, 1.4% and 0.9%, using GARCH, and 
1.2%, 1.5% and 0.4%, using OLS. Unión Fenosa’s abnormal returns when the Hidrocantábrico 
takeovers are announced are not statistically significant, but this was at the time a small competitor. 
Overall, the results suggest that increased concentration derives into higher market power for all the 
firms in the market, along the lines of Eckbo (1983) and Aktas et al. (2006).  
On occasion of the takeover of Scottish Power by Iberdrola, in contrast, Brittish competitors 
Centrica and National Power experience non-significant positive abnormal returns of 0.9% and 0.4%, 
respectively, both with models GARCH and OLS. A possible explanation is that the Brittish market 
was characterized by a lower level of market power than the Spanish electricity market. Whereas the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) index in the early years of the XXI Century was below 1000 in the UK, 
it was between 1500 and 1800 in Spain (Matthes et al., 2005). As explained by Duso et al. (2006) a 
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positive reaction by competitors could be explained by the takeovers revealing information about 
potential efficiency gains in the industry as a whole. However, the fact that competitors react 
differently in markets with different degrees of concentration, suggests that market power is a more 
plausible explanation.  
B. Mergers and Acquisitions of European Energy Firms between 2000 and 2007 
In this sub-section, we analyze the impact of 40 events7 related to mergers and acquisitions by 11 of 
the most important energy firms in Europe. The abnormal returns of these firms’ shares for these 
events are computed using OLS and GARCH. These 11 firms are: two German (RWE and E.ON), two 
Italiandos (ENI and ENEL), one French (Suez), four Spanish (Endesa, Gas Natural, Iberdrola and 
Unión Fenosa), one Swedish (Vattenfall) and one Portuguese (EDP). These firms were quoted in the 
stock markets between 2001 and 2007. We collected surprise mergers and acquisitions events for these 
companies using databases LEXIS-NEXIS and OSIRIS, between July 10th 2001 and May 31st, 2007.  
GARCH and OLS individual regressions for each firm show two results:8 
The firms that were mostly involved in selling transactions (Endesa and Iberdrola) experience 
statistically significant positive abnormal returns at the 1% level with both methods. For Endesa these 
returns are 3.7% using GARCH and 2.7% using OLS; while for Iberdrola they are 1.5% and 1.2% 
respectively.  
The firms that were mostly involved in buying transactions mostly experience statistically 
significant negative abnormal returns. Only three of them experienced the opposite sign: Suez and 
EDP both with GARCH and OLS, and E.ON only with GARCH. 
IV. Concluding Comments: Competition Policy, National Champions and Corporate 
Control 
Case studies and econometric evidence presented in this paper, based on the experience of European 
countries, suggest that takeovers in the energy sectors i) tend to coincide with regulatory reform; ii) 
are very costly for buying firms; iii) generate significant gains for target shareholders; and iv) depend 
on the degree of (product) market power in terms of the impact on competitors and the shareholders 
gains to be made in the market for corporate control. 
An interesting feature of the takeovers of Hidrocantábrico and Endesa examined above is that the 
regulatory game conditioned the nature and identity of the firms that eventually resulted from the 
takeover battles. In Hidrocantábrico, eventually the winning bidder was Electricidade de Portugal in 
coalition with a regional savings bank (Cajastur) partially controlled by the Asturias regional 
government. In the Endesa takeovers some years later, Enel of Italy, with the Italian state as the largest 
bidder, won the contest against E.On after forming a coalition with the Spanish construction company 
Acciona. As the examples suggest, there is a risk that a disproportionate amount of Type I errors will 
occur: some good mergers will not be authorized. There is then a trade off between the different 
expertise of several regulators. Wolak (2007) argues that "few mergers involving generation unit 
owners in wholesale electricity markets will be able to survive this multi-stage, federal and state 
antitrust and regulatory approval process and still provide value to the shareholders of the merged 
companies. The public benefit standard applied by most public utility commissions provides state 
                                                     
7 As in the previous section, three observations are taken into account for every event: the day before, the anouncement 
day, and the day after the announcement.  
8 These results are qualitatively the same using pooled OLS and SURE regressions for all firms, but the tests reveal that the 
system of equations does not significantly improve in efficiency relative to the individual firm regressions (see García-
Rendón, 2010). 
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governments with a substantial ability to extract financial concessions from the merging parties that 
may cause the merging parties to terminate potentially beneficial mergers." This raises the risk not 
only of efficient mergers not happening, but also of inefficient firms winning in some takeover battles: 
if winning takeover battles is costly and protracted, it will not be the firms that are best at producing 
electricity that win, but rather the best at playing the political game, or the ones able and willing to 
foot the bill of these protracted processes, such as firms with bad governance or public ownership. 
A merger or acquisition (especially if it takes the form of a takeover) changes the objective 
function of policy makers because more light is projected into the industry, consumers and other 
stakeholders mobilize and this has a well documented impact on the potential (lower) wealth gains to 
be extracted from the transaction. The existing literature shows that mergers in regulated industries 
take longer to be completed and show a lower takeover success ratio than in other industries; there is 
also clear evidence that deregulation is ususally accompanied by a takeover wave. There is a small 
literature on the optimal allocation of merger authority in the vertical chain of government (see Trillas, 
2009). This literature focuses on the role of jurisdictional externalities in terms of the effect of a 
merger on the surplus that is captured by foreign consumers and the impact on foreign competitors, in 
a framework where a merger authority maximizes some combination of the surplus of national 
consumers and producers. There is no formal work to my knowledge on the role of regulatory 
authorities or on how to judge a merger from the point of view of it making more or less difficult the 
role of regulators when there are jurisdictional externalities. 
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